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Burnham: Let's Repeal the Field Code!

LET'S REPEAL THE FIELD CODE!
Scott J. Burnham1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, the Montana legislature unanimously repealed Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-722, which made employment
contracts unenforceable by the employer beyond a term of two
years. 2 That in itself, while a good thing, was not particularly significant. 3 But as Gilderoy Lockhart said to Harry Potter, "it's a
start, Harry, it's a start."4 The 1895 Montana legislature had
taken that statute, among others, from the California Civil Code. 5
California had adapted its statutes from the Field Civil Code,
which David Dudley Field authored and proposed in the 1860s for
New York, although New York never adopted it.6 The Montana
1. Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law. I am grateful for the
research assistance of John Mastin, a recent graduate of The University of Montana School
of Law.
2. Before it was repealed, Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-722 (2003) (repealed
2005) provided:
A contract to render personal services cannot be enforced against the employee
beyond the term of 2 years from the commencement of service under it, but if the
employee voluntarily continues his service under it beyond that time, the contract
may be referred to as affording a presumptive measure of the compensation.
This statute was codified in Title 28, Chapter 2, Part 7, which is captioned "Illegal Objects
and Provisions." This careless use of terms is another irritant of the Field Code. One
should be concerned about committing an illegal act, but the act described in this statute making an employment contract for more than two years - was in no way illegal. There
was no prohibition against making or performing such an agreement, nor was the agreement void. It was simply unenforceable, and even then, only by the employer. I am grateful to Dan Browder, a student at The University of Montana School of Law, for pointing out
this distinction. See 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1374-77 (1962).
3. The brevity of the bill repealing Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-722 was
noted in Robert Natelson, Billings House Member Sponsors Smartest Bill, BILLINGS OUTPOST, April 21, 2005, at 5. The bill read "Section 1. Repealer. Section 28-2-722, MCA, is
repealed. The End." Id. (quoting H.B. 257, 59th Leg., 2005 Mont. Laws ch. 166), available
at http://www.billingsnews.com/story?storyid=16814&issue=258 (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
4. J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS 91 (1999). This was
my favorite line from the book. I can't believe it didn't make it into the movie.
5. See infra Part III, where I discuss the interpretation of the Montana Code Annotated's historical annotations following each statute. The historical annotation following
Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-722 (2003) (repealed 2005) is:
En. Sec. 2675, Civ. C. 1895; re-en. Sec. 5258, Rev. C. 1907; re-en. Sec. 7773, R.C.M.
1921; Cal. Civ. C. Sec. 1980; Field Civ. C. Sec. 1013; re-en. Sec. 7773, R.C.M. 1935;
R.C.M. 1947, 41-206; amd. Sec. 20, Ch. 117, L. 1979.
6. See, e.g., Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-722 (2003) (repealed 2005), which
derived from former California Civil Code section 1980 (Deering 1885) (repealed 1937),
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legislature should continue its good work by repealing the remaining Field Civil Code statutes that were enacted in Montana. This
essay explains why. 7 Part II explains the general background of
the Field Code, Part III explains the background of the Montana
statutes, Part IV discusses the problems caused by the Field Code
in Montana jurisprudence, and Part V concludes that the Field
Code statutes should be repealed from the Montana Code.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE FIELD CODE

Although confined to one compact place in Field's original
code, some 766 Field Code provisions are scattered throughout the
Montana Code Annotated, making the task of tracking them down
difficult. A substantial number are found in Title 70, in the area
of property.8 These were the subject of scrutiny by my colleague
Robert Natelson, whose conclusion about the modern utility of the
statutes was very similar to mine, if stated with more restraint.9
Title 1 of the Montana Code Annotated contains the "maxims of
jurisprudence." 10 These pithy sayings are derived from Roman
Law. There is nothing wrong with them as hortatory bromides,
but when reduced to black letter law they can cause great mischief, as we shall see. 1 ' Title 27 contains a number of Field Code
which derived from

DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIL

CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

section 1013 (Proposed Draft 1865); THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 982 (Paul Lagass6 ed.,

Columbia Univ. Press, 6th ed. 2000), available at http://www.bartleby.con65/fi/FieldDa.html (last visited Feb 2, 2006).
7. I previously expressed my point of view about the Field Code in Andrew P. Morriss,
Scott J. Burnham & James C. Nelson, Debating the Field Civil Code 105 Years Late, 61
MONT. L. REV. 371 (2000) [hereinafter Debate]. See also Andrew P. Morriss, Decius S.
Wade's Necessity for Codification, 61 MONT. L. REV. 407 (2000); Andrew P. Morriss, "This
State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws" - Lessons from One Hundred Years of Codification
in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 359 (1995) [hereinafter Lessons from One Hundred Years].
8. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 70 (2005).

9. In Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 17, 93
(1990), the author concludes:
Thus may we speculate and trace pictures of what might be. The precise forms of
those pictures remain of secondary importance. Of primary importance is the following: When left to a developing common law, the rules on running covenants
would be home-grown. They would meet the needs and ideals of justice, not of
somewhere else, but of Montana.
10. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 1, ch. 3 (2005).

11. See infra Part IV.C. for discussion of Montana Code Annotated section 1-3-204
(2005). The maxims of jurisprudence also caused mischief in Roundup Cattle Feeders v.
Horpestad, 184 Mont. 480, 603 P.2d 1044 (1979), in which a feedlot operator fed cattle for a
number of months according to contract, but was unable to continue because of financial
circumstances brought on by events beyond its control. The feedlot operator sought to recover in restitution the value of the benefit conferred upon the owner of the cattle for sev-
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statutes in the areas of remedies and torts. 12 Field Code statutes
also lurk in Title 30, in such commercial areas as sales, auctions,
factors, and trademarks; in Title 31, credit transactions; Title 39,
employment; Title 40, family law; Title 41, minors; Title1369, regulation of carriers; and Title 71, mortgages and pledges.
A quick glance at these statutes indicates their antiquated
flavor. Some are merely unhelpful, like this guidance on the remedy for the tort of seduction: "The damages for seduction rest in
the sound discretion of the jury."14 Similarly unhelpful is a statute for the chartering of a ship:
Contract for letting of ship. The contract by which a ship is let is
termed a charter party. By it the owner may either let the capacity
or burden of the ship, continuing the employment of the owner's
master, crew, and equipments, or may surrender the entire ship to
them himself. The master or part
the charterer, who then provides
15
owner may be a charterer.

Other statutes are absurd. Consider this sequence from the chapter on Sales that seems to proceed by describing the sound of one
hand clapping, then the other, and then the two together:
Agreement to sell. An agreement to sell is a contract by which one
engages, for a price, to transfer to another the title to a certain
thing.16

Agreement to buy. An agreement to buy is a contract by which
one engages to1 7accept from another and pay a price for the title to a
certain thing.
Agreement to sell and buy. An agreement to sell and buy is a

contract by which one engages to transfer the title to a certain thing
to another, who engages to accept the same from him and to pay a
price therefor. 18

Things go from humorous to dangerous when the Code states
the rule for implied warranties in a contract for sale:
eral months' worth of feeding. The usual rule, described by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS section 374 (1981), is that a contract breaker may recover in restitution after
paying damages. However, the Montana Supreme Court denied Roundup's claim for restitution, citing Montana Code Annotated section 1-3-208 (1979), which provides in its entirety, "No one can take advantage of his own wrong." Roundup Cattle Feeders, 184 Mont.
at 485, 603 P.2d at 1047.
12. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-317 (2005).
13. See, e.g., id. §§ 30-11-101, 31-1-101, 39-2-101, 40-2-101, 41-1-101, 69-11-101, 71-1101.
14. Id. § 27-1-322.
15. Id. § 70-8-201.
16. Id. § 30-11-104.
17. Id. § 30-11-105.
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-106 (2005).
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No implied warranty in mere contract of sale. Except as prescribed by this part, a mere contract of sale or agreement to sell
does not imply a warranty. 19

This rule is, of course, the opposite of the rule applicable to warranties implied in the sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").20 The conflict between the two warranty provisions is easily resolved, as the more particular statute applying to
the sale of goods creates an exception to the more general statute
applying to all sales. 2 1 Why wasn't this statute repealed when the
UCC was enacted? Presumably it still applies to those sales contracts not covered by the narrower Article 2, which applies only to
the sale of goods. Therein lies the danger, because drafters and
judicial interpreters of many transactions outside the scope of
UCC Article 2, such as software contracts and contracts for the
sale of electricity, apply Article 2 by analogy. 22 However, in Montana, we would have to apply the antiquated Field Code rules
rather than the rules supplied by the more modern UCC. For example, under Montana Code Annotated section 30-11-210, a buyer
of software in Montana would get no implied warranty of the
23
merchantability of the product.
Speaking of danger, Field did not realize the firestorm he was
starting when he included this provision addressing unborn children among his Code provisions on the rights of minors: "A child
conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person, so
far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth."24 For subsequent developments, see the proposed
Montana "Protection for the Unborn Child Act," which would
25
make it a criminal offense to cause the death of an unborn child.
19. Id. § 30-11-210.
20. See Montana Code Annotated section § 30-2-314(1), one of Montana's U.C.C. statutes, which provides in pertinent part that "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind."
21. If we did not know this general rule, sure enough Montana Code Annotated section
1-2-102 (2005) informs us:
Intention of the legislature - particular and general provisions. In the
construction of a statute, the intention of the legislature is to be pursued if possible. When a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former, so a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it.
22. See, e.g., Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 92 N.Y.2d
458, 468 (1998) (applying U.C.C. § 2-609 to the sale of electricity by analogy).
23. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-210 (2005).

24. Id. § 41-1-103.
25. H.B. 231, 59th Leg. (Mont. 2005).
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This proposed "amendment" to the statute flows logically from
Field's words.
Over the years, the Montana legislature has repealed a number of Field Code statutes, often replacing them with the more
modern uniform laws. For example, Field Code statutes in the
area of real property rentals were replaced by the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act in 1977,26 and almost a hundred
Field Code statutes in the area of trusts and estates were replaced
by the Uniform Probate Code in 197427 and the Trust Code in
1989.28 But much work remains to be done!
Of course, not every Field Code statute warrants repeal. A
few serve a regulatory function or purposefully change the common law rule. 29 These should remain, but those merely stating
the common law as it stood in the 1860s should be repealed. 30
III.

BACKGROUND OF THE MONTANA STATUTES

The focus here is contracts, where 152 Field Code statutes remain in Title 28. 3 1 Where did these contract statutes come from?
When I went to law school, contract law was taught as common
law. I remember the professor calling to our attention something
in the back of the textbook known as the UCC, which he recommended we look at some rainy day. However, even the UCC,
while it calls itself a code, generally serves the goal of facilitating
rather than regulating. The UCC enshrines the principle of freedom of contract - parties are generally free to change the rules.
The rules, as provided by the UCC, are "default rules" to be applied in the absence of agreement. 32 Under the UCC, the rules are
also trumped by waiver, course of dealing, course of performance,
industry practice, etc. 3 3 They are also intended to be flexible 26. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-24-101 to -442 (2005).
27. Id. §§ 72-1-101 to 72-5-502, 72-16-601 to -612.
28. Id. §§ 72-33-101 to 72-36-302.
29. See infra Part IV.C. for discussion of MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-1401 (2005).
30. See Scott J. Burnham, The War Against Arbitration in Montana, 66 MONT. L. REV.
139, 146-148 (2005) [hereinafter War Against Arbitration],in which I discussed the danger
of taking an area of the law that is facilitatory and making it regulatory by codifying it.
31. In addition, there are also almost 100 Field Code statutes in the areas of agency
and guaranty in Title 28. These could be eliminated without creating a void in the law, as
the law in those areas may now be found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958),

and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (1996).
32. U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-302 (2005).
33. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-205 (2001), 2-208 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-205, 30-2208 (2005).
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they are the rules because they reflect commercial practice, not
the rules handed down from above to those in commerce.
While in theory the principles of contract law govern all contracts, frequently the law with respect to some particular transaction becomes so rule-bound, so regulated, that it is spun off and
not considered part of the general rubric of contract law anymore. 34 Examples of separately codified areas are credit transactions, 35 consumer transactions, 3 6 and insurance contracts. 3 7 Beyond this is special interest legislation which takes us by surprise
when we find statutes governing particular transactions, such as
those governing the sale of farm implement dealerships,38 wheelchair purchases, 39 and liability of ski resorts. 40 Traditionally
though, the basic core of contracts has been developed through the
common law.
In Montana, however, the law of contracts, along with the
other traditional common law areas of torts and property, is statutory. The source of Montana's laws lies in a Nineteenth Century
reform movement called codification. The codifiers believed that
41
common law was inaccessible - it was like having no law at all.
Robert Rantoul, a contemporary codifier of Field's, stated that
"[n]o man can tell what the Common Law is; therefore it is not a
law: for a law is a rule of action; but a rule which is unknown can
govern no man's conduct."4 2 Field himself complained, "[n]o
Judge should have power to decide a cause without a rule to de43
cide it by, else the suitor is subjected to his caprice."
In the 1860s, David Dudley Field, a New York lawyer, toiled
for years on codification. Field codified not only substantive areas
of law like contracts and property, but laws for local governments,
civil procedure, and even international law. The attraction of the
34. One scholar refers to the law of contracts as the law of "leftovers." LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 193 (1965).

35. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 31 (2005).
36. Id. tit. 30, ch. 14, part 1.
37. Id. tit. 33.
38. Id. §§ 30-11-801 to -811.
39. Montana Wheelchair Warranty Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-1201 to -1207
(2005).
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-731 (2005).
41. Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture
and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 758
(2003) (quoting PETER J. KING, UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICA 302 (1986)).
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, CODIFICATION OF THE LAW, IN SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 349, 354 (A.P. Sprague ed.,

1884)).
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codes is readily apparent - the codes would produce the same law
for every jurisdiction, clearly organized and easily accessible.
Field's scheme never took hold in New York, 44 but it did catch on
in California and the Dakota Territories, which enacted much of
his Code. 4 5 When the Fourth Montana Legislature met in 1895, it
decided to adopt the Field Code, employing the California version.
These statutes can be found in the Montana Code Annotated
using the convenient History provided by our Legislative Council
after each statute. For example, following Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-409, a statute we will discuss momentarily, we
find this annotation:
History: En. Sec. 2122, Civ. C. 1895; re-en. Sec. 4983, Rev. C. 1907;
re-en. Sec. 7485, R.C.M. 1921; Cal. Civ. C. Sec. 1577; Field Civ. C.
Sec. 762; re-en. Sec. 7485, R.C.M. 1935; R.C.M. 1947, 13-313.46

If we break this information down into its component parts and
arrange them in chronological order, we see its historical significance:
Information

Significance

Field Civ. C. Sec. 762
Cal. Civ. C. Sec. 1577
En. Sec. 2122, Civ. C. 1895
re-en. Sec. 4983, Rev. C. 1907
re-en. Sec. 7485, R.C.M. 1921
re-en. Sec. 7485, R.C.M. 1935
R.C.M. 1947, 13-313

Field Civil Code source
California Civil Code source
Enacted in the Montana Civil Code, 1895
Re-enacted in the Revised Code, 1907
Re-enacted in the Revised Code of Montana, 1921
Re-enacted in the Revised Code of Montana, 1935
Re-enacted in the Revised Code of Montana, 1947

This history proves extremely useful when researching the
law in areas governed by sections of the Montana Code Annotated.
The researcher can go back to the Field Civil Code for additional
information about the "original intent" of the drafter because
Field often provided notes and sources in his Code. One can then
look to cases decided under the corresponding California Civil
Code section for persuasive authority. The California cases are
particularly useful when, as is often the case, there are no Mon44. New York did enact Field's Code of Civil Procedure, thus putting that state out of
step with most other jurisdictions that have enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Arvo Van Alstyne, The California Civil Code, in 6 WEST'S ANN. CAL. CODES 1-43, at text
accompanying n.10 (1954), available at http://www.sandiego.edulrcdcivil-code.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2006).
45. In addition to Montana and California, the Field Civil Codes have also been enacted, at least in part, in such states as North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Idaho,
New Mexico, Alabama, and Guam. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-13 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 53-4-9 (2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 63 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-901
(2005); N.M. STAT. § 40-2-1 (2005); ALA. CODE § 8-1-20 (2005); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 85313 (2005).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-409 (2005).
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tana cases on point. Montana courts will not blindly follow the
California precedent, however. As the Montana Supreme Court
correctly stated in Grady v. City of Livingston,4 7 where an attorney had urged the California interpretation on the court:
We are not unmindful of the rule to the effect that when one jurisdiction adopts a statute from another that the adopting jurisdiction
also adopts the construction placed on the statute by the highest
court of the state from which the statute is taken. But we have laid
down a further rule which is that "this court will not blindly follow
the construction given a particular statute by the court of a state
from which we borrowed it, when the decision does not appeal to us
4s
as founded on right reasoning."

Curiously, however, there is little history explaining why the
Montana legislature adopted the Field Code as state law. 4 9 Perhaps Montanans were worried confusion would ensue if the new
state was governed by the common law. Since Montana had been
Spanish and French prior to its acquisition by the United States,
questions could arise over what law prevailed. This was apparently the justification for California's adoption of the Field Code,
for California, which had been part of Mexico just prior to state50
hood, also traced its legal ancestry to European civil codes.
Cynics argued that enactment of the Field Code in Montana
justified the legislature's continued existence. In other words, legislators were provided job security because of the ongoing need to
reconcile the code sections with other statutes that were not repealed, amend them to accommodate local conditions for which
they were not suited, and update them as time passed. 5 1 The
whole-hearted approval of the Field Code, however, was stated in
terms that were far from cynical. Colonel Wilbur F. Sanders, a
former U.S. Senator and a leading proponent of codification, wrote
with cheerful naivet6 to Field's brother:
[A] citizen of Montana, who has but little money to spend on books,
needs to have lying on his table but three: an English Dictionary to
teach the knowledge of his own mother tongue; this Book of the Law
[the Field Codes], to show him his rights as a member of civilized
society; and the
good old Family Bible to teach him his duties to God
2
5
and to man.

47. 115 Mont. 47, 141 P.2d 346 (1943).
48. Id. at 57-58, 141 P.2d at 351 (quoting Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Sparrow, 29
Mont. 132, 74 P. 197, 198 (1903)).
49. This history is recounted in Lessons from One Hundred Years, supra note 7, and
Natelson, supra note 9.
50. Van Alstyne, supra note 44.
51. Lessons from One Hundred Years, supra note 7, at 408-09.
52. See Debate, supra note 7, at 380.
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There were, of course, critics at the time, though they were
few and swept aside in the rush to reform. One of the national
critics, James C. Carter, 53 made these points in opposition to codification:
1. In fact, lay people would not be able to read or comprehend
codes. And those who could read and understand them,
would neglect to read them.
2. Nonlawyers would find the "precise formulas" of codes less
comprehensible than "the simple principles of justice."
3. Codification was impractical because no one could anticipate the facts of future transactions. The codes would freeze
the development of the law and lose the evolutionary advan54
tage of the common law.
If Carter could see Montana jurisprudence today, he would
have the pleasure of saying, "I told you so." His point that lay
people would not be able to comprehend the codes is exemplified
by those self-taught legal experts like our Freemen friends who
are quite adept at stringing together code sections into legal
sounding gobbledygook. 5 5 Carter's allegation that those who
could understand code sections would neglect them is exemplified
by many Montana lawyers, who are still not habituated to look for
relevant statutes, and, as this essay will relate, by the Montana
Supreme Court.
Carter's point that nonlawyers would find precise formulas
less comprehensible than simple principles rang true with me
when I was asked to teach contract law at the Training Institute
for Judges of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction. 56 I was given an
hour to make my presentation to that group, which is composed
largely of nonlawyers. I knew it would be pointless to enumerate
a bunch of code rules and exceptions that they would be unable to
remember or apply. Instead, I asked the judges to imagine them53. Roscoe Pound had this to say about Carter in David Dudley Field:An Appraisal,in
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS: CELEBRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL RE-

6-7 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949):
In New York when you think of David Dudley Field you recall also his redoubtable
adversary, the American apostle of the nineteenth-century historical jurisprudence, James Coolidge Carter. As American lawyers thought in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, Carter would have been rated the higher. As we think
today, Carter has no longer a significant place in the science of law.
54. See Debate, supra note 7, at 374-75.
55. See, e.g., materials posted at Freedom Domain, http://www.freedomdomain.com
(last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
56. See my prior discussion of this lecture in War Against Arbitration,supra note 30, at
143-44.
FORM
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selves as the gentry in England a thousand years ago who were
asked to decide contract cases. Those early practitioners of the
common law tradition did not have statute books, cases, or encyclopedias readily available to them. Rather, they looked to two
basic principles: 1) when the parties have used their freedom of
contract to make their own agreement, enforce the agreement
they made; and 2) when the parties have not established a rule to
govern themselves, do what is reasonable. I told the judges that if
they followed the same principles - freedom tempered by what is
reasonable and prudent - they would deduce the correct result in
57
a contract case 90% of the time.
One might argue that there is little difference between the
common law and a code that merely states common law principles.
Would such a scheme achieve the goals of the common law while
making the principles accessible? The answer is no. To say that a
code merely states the common law is an oxymoron. The common
law is fluid, not set in stone. The common law also uses the basic
rule of reason to fill in gaps in the law. But what happens when
statutes leave a gap? The UCC expressly provides that "[u]nless
displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the principles of law and equity.., supplement its provisions."5 8 Consequently, the UCC operates like the common law.
By contrast, in a matter governed by the Field Code, apparently a
gap means that the legislature chose not to allow the court to read
in the common law in the omitted area. 5 9
The fact that the Field Code stated specific rules applicable to
an earlier historical era is the third of Carter's criticisms. Here
again, Carter was right. The common law of contracts in Montana
is frozen in the Nineteenth Century, and not just in 1895, when
the Field Code sections were enacted, but in 1860, when they were
written.
Furthermore, the Field Code does not state the basic principles of the common law. It never mentions the primary rule freedom of contract! To further undermine freedom of contract,
the statutory structure seduces lawyers and judges into thinking
that the rules are regulations. This undermines one of the princi57. The other 10% is where some statute has mucked up these basic rules. Id.
58. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2004), enacted at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-103 (2005).
59. For example, the Montana Supreme Court held that the gift of an engagement ring
was not a conditional gift because the statutes on gifts, which were derived from the Field
Code, were silent on the topic of conditional gifts, and "[t]his court declines the invitation to
create a new category of gifting by judicial fiat." Albinger v. Harris, 2002 MT 118, 34, 310
Mont. 27,
34, 48 P.3d 711, 34 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-3-201 to -205 (2005)).
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pal purposes of contract law, which is not to regulate transactions,
but to facilitate them. We will now turn to some examples of how
the Field Code has harmed Montana jurisprudence.
IV.

PROBLEMS IN MONTANA JURISPRUDENCE CAUSED BY THE
FIELD CODE

The earliest critics of the Field Code pointed out that codification of the common law would harm the state's jurisprudence
rather than help it.6o Some of the problems caused by the Field
Code include:
A. The Field Code is ignored because it does not state the
rules correctly;
B. The Field Code is ignored because it does not allow the law
to develop along reasonable lines;
C. The Field Code is followed mechanically, with sections
taken out of context;
D. The Field Code is tortured to make it say what the user
wants it to say; and
E. The Field Code is law frozen in an earlier time.
We will now explore some areas of contract law exemplifying these
problems.
A.

The Field Code Is Ignored Because It Does Not State the
Rules Correctly

We begin with an area where the Montana Supreme Court
has gotten the law right - but only by ignoring the Field Code.
The Montana Code Annotated contains Field Code statutes in the
area of mistake that provide as follows:
28-2-401. When apparent consent not free. (1) An apparent
con61
sent is not real or free when obtained through... mistake.
28-2-408. Kinds of mistake. Mistake may be either of fact or
law.

62

28-2-409. What constitutes mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is a
mistake not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on
person making the mistake and consisting in:

the part of the

(1) an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact, past or present, material to the contract; or
60. See Debate, supra note 7, at 374-75.
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-401 (2005).
62. Id. § 28-2-408.
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(2) belief in the present existence of a thing material to the contract
which does not exist
or in the past existence of such a thing which
63
has not existed.
28-2-410. What constitutes mistake of law. Mistake of law constitutes a mistake, within the meaning of this part, only when it
arises from:
(1) a misapprehension of the law by all parties, all supposing that
they knew and understood it and all making substantially the same
mistake as to the law; or
(2) a misapprehension of the law by one party of which the others
64
are aware at the time of contracting but which they do not rectify.

It is not surprising that section 28-2-409 provides that a mistake of fact (the usual kind of mistake) is grounds for rescission.
What is surprising is that the statute refers to mistake "on the
part of the person making the mistake." This language suggests
that mistake is grounds for rescission even if the mistake is unilateral, that is, only one party is under the mistaken belief. This
reading of the statute is reinforced by the language of section 282-410, which states that a mistake of law is grounds for rescission
only if the misapprehension is "by all parties," that is, a mutual
mistake.

The doctrine of mutual mistake is so ingrained in the law that
the Montana Supreme Court has never applied section 28-2-409
literally in mutual mistake cases. For example, in Carey v.
Wallner,6 5 the purchasers of a nursing home tried to rescind the
contract on grounds that the parties both believed a license was
not required to operate it, when in fact a license was required.
The court began its analysis by citing section 28-2-409. It then
added:
A unilateral mistake is not normally grounds for relief for the mistaken party, whereas a mutual mistake is. A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they
66
based their bargain.

The authority the court cites for this correct statement is an Idaho
case! We should not need an Idaho case if we have a Montana
statute.
In defense of this nonliteral reading of a Field Code provision,
it may be argued that the court does not have to apply a Field
63. Id. § 28-2-409.
64. Id. § 28-2-410 (emphasis added).
65. 223 Mont. 260, 725 P.2d 557 (1986).
66. Id. at 265-66, 725 P.2d at 561 (citing Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d
1099, 1102 (1983)).
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Code provision literally because it can be read in the context of the
common law. However, the theory of the Field Code is that the
common law has been pre-empted by one convenient source. In
fact, the Montana Code Annotated tells us so in section 1-1-108, a
section not taken from the Field Code:
Common law - applicability of. In this state there is no common

law in any case where the law is declared by statute. But where not
so declared, if the same is applicable and of a general nature and
statutes, the common law shall be the law
not in conflict with the
67
and rule of decision.
One may wonder where the Montana Supreme Court is to look for
the common law when it is appropriate to do so. The next section
of the Montana Code Annotated, section 1-1-109, a so-called "reception" statute, provides that when the common law applies, the
common law should be found in the law of England. 68 This section
was recently cited by the court in Dorwart v. Caraway,6 9 a case
holding that citizens have a private right of action for violation of
the Montana Constitution:
We conclude that the Bivens line of authority buttressed by § 874A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are sound reasons for applying
a cause of action for money damages for violations of those self-executing provisions of the Montana Constitution. We also conclude
that those rights protected by Article II, Sections 10, 11 and 17 of
the Montana Constitution are self-executing based on the same
analysis employed by the Supreme Court of Vermont in Shields. We
conclude that this result is further compelled by our own statutory
law and, in particular, §§ 1-1-109 and 27-1-202, MCA. Section 1-1109, MCA, provides that:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or
inconsistent with the constitution of the United States or the
constitution or laws 70of this state, is the rule of decision in all the
courts of this state.
This analysis follows a discussion of the decisions of other states
that had addressed the issue. It is somewhat startling to see the
court, after consideration of those persuasive recent authorities
from our sister states, turn to the ancient common law of England
for authority.
67.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 1-1-108 (2005).

68. Although Montana is one of the few states that has enacted the Field Code, many
states have "reception" statutes that declare the law to be the common law of England,
sometimes the common law up to a particular date. A catalog of these statutes is found in
Joseph Fred Benson, Reception of the Common Law in Missouri: Section 1.010 as Interpreted by the Supreme Court of Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REV. 595, 605-06 (2002).
69. 2002 MT 240, 312 Mont. 1, 58 P.3d 128.
70. Id. T 44.
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Of course, if English and recent American jurisprudence conflicted, the court would find a way to avoid the application of the
English law, not necessarily out of a parochial rejection of the foreign, but from the enlightened precept of the common law that in
the absence of precedent, the court should follow the better view.
71
For example, in both Aetna Accident & Liability Co. v. Miller
and State ex rel. Metcalf v. District Court,72 where one of the parties made a strong argument for application of the common law
English rule, the court reviewed the American precedents and
deemed them to have greater weight than the obsolete English
law. The court in Aetna declined to follow the statute that prescribed English common law, stating:
Just what is meant by the "common law" in this connection, however, is a matter open to definition. Broadly speaking, it means, of
course, the common law of England; but it means that body ofjurisprudence as applied and modified by the courts of this country73up to
the time it became a rule of decision in this commonwealth.

It makes sense to allow the law to free itself from past restraints. This point was nicely made by the court in Metcalf, when
it said, "Im]any of the rules of the common law, however admirably adapted to monarchial England during the seventeenth or
eighteenth century, are altogether out of harmony with the spirit
of our democratic institutions and inapplicable to present-day conJ 7 4 But flexibility is a strength of the common law, not of
ditions[.]"
code law. The law cannot perform this function if it is frozen in
the year 1860.
B.

The Field Code Is Ignored Because It Does Not Allow the
Law to Develop Along Reasonable Lines

In the mistake cases, the Montana Supreme Court ignored
the literal language of the statute because the language of the
statute does not reflect what the statute is supposed to say. In
other cases, the court ignored the language of the statute because
the language of the statute gets in the way of the law's development.
In Montana Mountain Products v. Curl,75 the plaintiff, as the
former employer of the defendant, sought to enforce a restrictive
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

54 Mont. 377, 170 P. 760 (1918).
52 Mont. 46, 155 P. 278 (1916).
Aetna, 54 Mont. at 382, 170 P. at 760.
Metcalf, 52 Mont. at 49, 155 P. at 279.
2005 MT 102, 327 Mont. 7, 112 P.3d 979.
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covenant that the defendant had agreed to when she was an employee. The court referred to Montana Code Annotated section 282-703, which addresses the enforceability of restrictive covenants:
Contracts in restraint of trade generally void. Any contract by
which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
76
trade, or business of any kind, . . . is to that extent void.

The trial court took a look at this "clear and unambiguous" statute
and concluded that Montana law imposes an absolute restriction
on restrictive covenants. 77 The Montana Supreme Court rejected
this determination, stating that "this Court has held that only restraints on trade that are unreasonable are void."78 That is indeed the common law rule - the more sensible rule - but it is not

the rule enacted by the Montana legislature.
At least in Montana Mountain Products the statute was discussed in the text of the opinion, even if its import was ignored. In
Arrowhead School District No. 75 v. Klyap,7 9 the issue was the
enforceability of a liquidated damages clause. Nowhere is there
greater judicial hostility to freedom of contract than in the area of
liquidated damages, and the Field Code reflects that hostility.
The trial court determined that the liquidated damages clause
was enforceable in the light of the relevant statute, Montana Code
Annotated section 28-2-721.80 The statute begins by providing
that a liquidated damages provision is void, and then carves out
exceptions:
When provision fixing liquidated damages valid. (1) Every
contract by which the amount of damage to be paid or other compensation to be made for a breach of an obligation is determined in an-

ticipation thereof is to that extent void, except as expressly provided
in subsection (2).

(2) The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount
which shall be presumed to be an amount of damage sustained by a

breach thereof when, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage. 8 '

The law's abhorrence of liquidated damages stems from the
principle that the purpose of contract damages is to compensate
76. Id. 1 10 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2005)). The court goes on to note that
there are exceptions allowing restrictive covenants in sections 28-2-704 and 28-2-705 for
the sale of a business and the dissolution of a partnership that are not relevant to this case.

Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.

15.
11.

79. 2003 MT 294, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250.

80. Id.

9.

81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (2005) (emphasis added).
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the injured party, not to punish the breaching party. Therefore, a
clause that provides a penalty for breach will not be enforced,
while a clause that compensates the injured party should be enforced. In fact, a liquidated damages clause can be a significant
cost-savings provision in the event of a dispute, for the plaintiff
may be able to get summary judgment, at least with respect to the
damages. Such a clause can also make it efficient for a plaintiff to
recover damages that are otherwise difficult to prove. If the defendant can readily challenge the liquidated damages provision,
however, these savings are lost.
In Klyap, the Montana Supreme Court overruled a long line of
cases that had made it easy for a party to challenge liquidated
damages provisions and substituted a new test that will make it
harder to avoid liquidated damages clauses.8 2 The new test inquires whether the clause is unconscionable. In a long and erudite opinion by Justice Nelson, the court relegated discussion of
the statute, which we would expect to be the cornerstone of the
analysis, to a footnote:
According to the language of § 28-2-721, MCA, liquidated damages
are only allowed in a situation where damages are impractical or
extremely difficult to prove. However, this section was adopted in
1895 from the Field Civil Code and consequently does not reflect the
modern principle that parties in any type of situation can agree to
liquidated damages as a matter of freedom of contract.8 3

It will not surprise the reader that I could not agree more with the
court's implication that Field Code statutes are frequently outmoded and frequently impede freedom of contract. But that does not
seem to be a sufficient reason to ignore the mandate of the Montana legislature. I laud the result in Klyap, with its attendant
paean to freedom of contract,8 4 but am troubled that it was
achieved by ignoring a statute.
There is a legitimate concern about whether liquidated damages should be enforced when they are dictated by the party with
greater bargaining power, one of the factors in unconscionability
analysis. Interestingly, California achieved a similar result the
straightforward way: it amended the statute. The amended statute makes a useful distinction, providing that the liquidated damages clause is presumptively valid when found in a commercial
82. Klyap,

45-56.

83. Id.
24 n.7.
84. "The fundamental tenet of modern contract law is freedom of contract; parties are
free to mutually agree to terms governing their private conduct as long as those terms do
not conflict with public laws." Id.
20 (citation omitted).
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contract and presumptively void when found in either a consumer
contract or a residential lease - transactions where one party notoriously lacks bargaining power.8 5
Frequent amendment is another way to keep the Field Code
statutes fresh. California, for example, has frequently amended
its Civil Code. However, this is a task of little concern to a citizen
legislature, and might provide fertile ground for lobbyists. Rather
than fix it, I say we throw it on the junk pile of legal history.
C.

The Field Code Is Followed Mechanically, with Sections
Taken Out of Context

Colonel Wilbur Sanders' view that all one would need to know
about the law is found in the Montana Code Annotated is simplistic and wrong.8 6 It is wrong because one cannot look at code sections in isolation. They were created as a codification of the common law and make sense only in the context of the common law,
not when ripped from that context.8 7 A good example of the Montana Supreme Court taking a Field Code section out of context
arises in the area of accord and satisfaction.
85. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1671 (2005) states:

Validity; standards for determination; applicability of section.
(a) This section does not apply in any case where another statute expressly applicable to the contract prescribes the rules or standard for determining the validity
of a provision in the contract liquidating the damages for the breach of the contract.
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), a provision in a contract liquidating the
damages for the breach of the contract is valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time the contract was made.
(c) The validity of a liquidated damages provision shall be determined under subdivision (d) and not under subdivision (b) where the liquidated damages are
sought to be recovered from either:
(1) A party to a contract for the retail purchase, or rental, by such party of
personal property or services, primarily for the party's personal, family, or
household purposes; or
(2) A party to a lease of real property for use as a dwelling by the party or
those dependent upon the party for support.
(d) In the cases described in subdivision (c), a provision in a contract liquidating
damages for the breach of the contract is void except that the parties to such a
contract may agree therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the
amount of damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the
case, it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage.
86. See supra text accompanying note 52.
87. Two of my astute former students, Judith Albright and Cathleen Sohlberg, pointed
out that this problem is exacerbated by electronic research, when the statute may be retrieved without the context of other statutes.
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The relevant Montana Code Annotated sections in the area of
accord and satisfaction provide as follows:
Accord - definition and effect. An accord is an agreement to accept in extinction of an obligation something different from or less
than that to which the person agreeing to accept is entitled. Though
the parties to an accord are bound to execute it,
yet it does not extin88
guish the obligation until it is fully executed.
Satisfaction - definition and effect. Acceptance by the creditor
of the consideration
of an accord extinguishes the obligation and is
89
called satisfaction.
These statutes simply state the common law. The issue that
frequently comes up with respect to an accord and satisfaction is
whether the creditor's acceptance of the debtor's offer to pay less
than the full amount of the debt, followed by payment of the lesser
amount, discharges the debt. For example, I say to you, "I don't
dispute that I owe you $1000. Are you willing to accept payment
of $600 to discharge the debt?" You agree and I pay you the $600.
You then sue me for the balance of $400 and I raise our agreement
as a defense. Are you entitled to the $400? The common law answer was yes. Our agreement is not enforceable because of the
pre-existing duty rule, which is just another way of saying that a
promise has to be supported by consideration. When I promised to
pay you $600, I was merely doing what I was already bound to do
anyway. To put it another way, you gave up $400, but you got
nothing in return.
The Field Code section on accord does not change this common law result. It defines an accord as "an agreement," but if an
exchange lacks consideration, then there is not an enforceable
agreement. Note also that this statute does not require that an
accord be in writing. The general rule is that oral contracts are
perfectly enforceable; the few exceptions are found in another
group of statutes called the Statute of Frauds.
For years, the Montana Supreme Court got the law of accord
and satisfaction right, often without paying attention to the statutes. 90 Then along came a case illustrating Carter's point that
those who can read code sections sometimes do not read them correctly. In Geissler v. Nelson,9 1 the court applied the relevant Mon88.
89.
90.
(1986).
91.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 28-1-1401 (2005).

Id. § 28-1-1402.
See Scott J. Burnham, A Primer on Accord and Satisfaction, 47 MONT. L. REV. 1
222 Mont. 409, 722 P.2d 632 (1986).
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tana Code Annotated sections to the facts and determined that
there had been an accord and satisfaction:
There is no doubt in the instant case but that Geissler accepted the

consideration tendered by Nelson which would constitute a satisfaction if in fact the parties entered into an accord. Section 28-1-1401,
MCA, clearly defines an accord as an "agreement" to extinguish the
original obligation
for something different or less than the creditor
92
is entitled.

So far, so good. The court then went on to apply an additional
statute from the Montana Code Annotated:
There, however, is the additional requirement that an offer to enter
an accord be accepted in writing. Section 28-1-1403, MCA, provides:
Part performance of an obligation, either before or after a
breach thereof, when expressly accepted by the creditor in writing in satisfaction or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in
writing for that purpose, though without any new consideration, extinguishes the obligation.
... We, therefore, hold that the District Court properly found that
there was no accord entered by the parties because there was
no
93
such "agreement" and even if there was it was not in writing.

Here the court got it wrong. There is no requirement that an
offer to enter into an accord must be accepted in writing. Section
28-1-1403 serves a different purpose, which may not be apparent
on its face, but becomes clear when the statute is examined in its
context. As discussed above, an accord is not enforceable if the
debt is undisputed, for then there is no consideration. As a practical matter, however, parties may wish to settle undisputed obligations with a lesser payment, and the law may wish to accommodate them. In many jurisdictions, this accommodation was accomplished through the common law. In Montana, it was
accomplished by the enactment of section 28-1-1403. 9 4
Through that statute, the legislature in its wisdom removed
the requirement of consideration to form an enforceable accord.
Like many statutes that dispense with consideration, it requires a
92. Id. at 413, 722 P.2d at 635.

93. Id., 722 P.2d at 635 (emphasis added).
94. MONT. CODE. ANN.§ 28-1-1403 (2005). This statute was not part of the Field Code,
but was borrowed from California along with the Field Code statutes. It was derived from
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1524 in 1895. History: En. Sec. 2063, Civ. C. 1895; re-en. Sec. 4957, Rev.
C. 1907; re-en. Sec. 7459, R.C.M. 1921; Cal. Civ. C. Sec. 1524; re-en. Sec. 7459, R.C.M.
1935; R.C.M. 1947, 58-504. The statute provides:
When part performance extinguishes obligation. Part performance of an ob-

ligation, either before or after a breach thereof, when expressly accepted by the
creditor in writing in satisfaction or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in
writing for that purpose, though without any new consideration, extinguishes the
obligation.
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signed writing as a consideration substitute. Therefore, if the
creditor agrees in a signed writing to accept a lesser payment, and
the debtor gives the lesser payment, the debt is discharged. But
the statute is not doing all the work the court would have it do in
Geissler. It does not require that an accord be in writing; it only
provides that an accord otherwise unenforceable for lack of consideration is enforceable if there is a writing signed by the creditor. 95
This example indicates the proper role statutes play in a common law system. If we presume freedom of contract and the common law, then we enact statutes for one of two purposes: for regulation or to change the common law rule. A statute like section
28-1-1403 is a salutary change in the common law rule. If it stood
on its own, not surrounded by statutes that merely state the common law rule, its purpose would be more clear.
What would happen if we were not able to look to the Montana Code Annotated to find our rules of contract law? We would
have to research the common law, and discover the reason for the
rules. In this event, there would probably be less mechanical application of the rules. Nowhere is the mechanical application of a
rule clearer than in the court's application of Montana Code Annotated section 1-3-204, which provides:
Waiver of benefit of a law. Anyone may waive the advantage of a
law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public

96
reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.
When the Montana Supreme Court has to determine whether parties may contract around a rule, it frequently looks to Montana
Code Annotated section 1-3-204 for guidance. For example, in
Rothwell v. Allstate Insurance Co. ,97 a federal court certified to the
Montana Supreme Court the question of whether an employee
could waive the rule found in Montana Code Annotated section 392-701(1) that an employer must indemnify an employee for expenses incurred by the employee. 98 The court stated that because
"Allstate relies on § 1-3-204,... resolution of the certified question
turns on whether § 39-2-701(1), MCA, was established for a public
reason." 99 The court concluded that waiver of the rule would be
contrary to "public policy." 10 0

95. Id. § 28-1-1403.

96. Id. § 1-3-204.
97. 1999 MT 50, 293 Mont. 393, 976 P.2d 512.

98. Id. ' 1.
99. Id. 6.
100. Id.

16.
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Dissenting, Justice Gray expressed concern that the court
provided little guidance for parties trying to make the distinction
called for in section 1-3-204.101 She stated:
My second point with regard to the error I perceive in the
Court's opinion is the Court's somewhat loose use of the term "an
expression of public policy" as the equivalent of the language "established for a public reason" which is contained in § 1-3-204, MCA. It
can - and should - be said that every statute duly enacted by the
Legislature is an expresion of public policy with regard to its subject
matter. However, the "public policy" connotation cannot properly be
equated to the "public reason" language in § 1-3-204, MCA, because
to do so would render § 1-3-204, MCA, a nullity. Section 1- 3-204,
MCA, clearly contemplates that only some laws have been established for a "public reason" and, pursuant to the statute, the benefit
of such laws cannot be waived by private contract. Interpreting
"public reason" and "public policy" as essentially identical renders
the language of § 1-3-204, MCA - permitting waiver of the advantage of a law intended solely for an individual's benefit - totally
ineffective and mere verbiage. Such a result clearly was not intended by the Legislature and we are obligated to interpret statutes
to give them effect wherever possible, rather than to render them
mere surplusage. Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
(1983), 207 Mont. 189, 194, 673 P.2d 469, 471 (citation omitted).
For these reasons, it is my view that the Court's implicit substitution of "an expression of public policy" for the statutory language
"established for a public reason" is both inappropriate and unsupported.
My disagreement with the result the Court reaches in this case
does not mean that no supportable arguments can be made for that
result. My disagreement is that the Court has not supported its result with any legal analysis
or authority. Absent such support, I
02
must respectfully dissent.

This dissent hits the nail on the head. If section 1-3-204 is saying
that under a regime of freedom of contract, parties cannot contract
around public policy, and public policy is whatever the legislature
declares it to be in statutes, then parties do not have freedom to
contract around any statute. And in a system where all contract
law is statutory, parties would not be able to contract around any
rule of contract law! This is, of course, contrary to the fundamental principle of contract law that divides rules into "immutable
rules" that cannot be varied by the parties and "default rules" that
can be varied. If the only contract statutes that were enacted
were regulatory, then the court's interpretation might make
sense. However, if the statutes are merely a codification of the
101. Id.
102. Id.

17-25 (Gray, J., dissenting).

']l 24-25 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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common law, including the default rules of the common law, then
10 3
it makes no sense to conclude that all the rules are immutable.
Such a conclusion deprives us of our freedom of contract.
It is all too easy, as Justice Gray points out, to support a result by pointing to a statute rather than to support it "with any
legal analysis or authority." 10 4 In fact, the error is compounded
when the statute in question is one of the Field Code provisions
that has no business being a statute in the first place. Section 1-3204, in context, is a maxim of equity, like "[t]he law disregards
trifles" or "[sluperfluity does not vitiate," both of which are also
codified in the Montana Code Annotated. 0 5 The maxims were
never intended to have their language scrutinized like regula06
tions, but were intended to aid in the administration of justice.
D.

The Field Code Is Tortured to Make It Say What the User
Wants It to Say

Just as malfeasance is worse than misfeasance, a greater sin
than carelessly reading a statute is intentionally torturing it to
force it to say what you want it to say. An example of where the
Montana Supreme Court has done that arises in the area of exculpatory clauses.
Miller v. Fallon County107 is probably best known as the case
that ended interspousal tort immunity in Montana. Lesser
known, and perhaps totally ignored, is the fact that it ended the
effectiveness of exculpatory clauses in Montana. An exculpatory
103. The principle that statutes are not immutable rules is clearly articulated in U.C.C.
section 1-102(3) (2004), which provides:
The effect of provisions of this code may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this code and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by this code may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations are to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-102 (2005). This principle is not, however, found in
the Field Code.
104. Rothwell, 1 25 (Gray, J., dissenting).
105. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-3-224, 1-3-228 (2005).
106. My apologies to the Montana Supreme Court for criticizing its use of Montana Code
Annotated section 1-3-204 (2005) in Cole v. Valley Ice Garden, 2005 MT 21, 325 Mont. 388,
106 P.3d 556, in War Against Arbitration,supra note 30, at 149 n.37. Prior to its official
publication, but after the law review went to press, the Court pulled its original opinion
and substituted another that does not mention the statute. See Cole v. Valley Ice Garden,
2005 MT 115, 327 Mont. 99, 113 P.3d 275.
107. 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/2

22

2006

Burnham:
Let's Repeal
theFIELD
Field Code!
LETS
REPEAL
THE
CODE

clause is a contractual provision whereby one party agrees not to
hold the other party liable for the other party's negligence.1 0 8
In Miller, Cecil Miller, an independent truck driver, contracted to render services to Pre-Fab Transit Co. As is customary
among truckers, Cecil asked permission to bring his wife Linda
along on his trips. The company agreed as long as Linda Miller
signed an agreement waiving her right to pursue any negligence
claim against Pre-Fab if she was injured. She was injured and
Pre-Fab raised the exculpatory clause as a defense.' 0 9
The analysis of exculpatory clauses was not new to the Montana Supreme Court. In an earlier case, Haynes v. County of Missoula, -1 0 when Haynes entered his horses in the Missoula County
Fair, the application contained an exculpatory clause relieving the
County of liability for negligence. Haynes sued Missoula County
for negligence when a fire in the horse barn destroyed the horses,
and the County defended by citing the exculpatory clause."' In
approaching the issue of whether the exculpatory clause was enforceable, the Montana Supreme Court looked to the traditional
analysis in which the court asked whether the area in which the
exculpation occurred was one of public interest or purely private
interest. If it was an area of public interest, where a party offered
an essential service to members of the public who would be denied
the service if they did not agree to an exculpatory clause, the
clause was not enforceable. However, if it was an area of private
interest, the clause was enforceable. 11 2 The test was clearly laid
out by the California Supreme Court in Tunkl v. Regents of the
11 3
University of California.
In Haynes, the Montana court applied
the Tunkl test, concluding that because the county fair was an
area of public interest, the exculpatory clause was not enforcea114
ble.
The Miller court, however, neglected to apply the Tunkl test
that it had established as precedent in Haynes."1 5 A cynic might
conclude that the reason was because under that test, the court
would have had to conclude that riding in a truck with a spouse is
an area of private rather than public interest, and that Linda
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

608 (8th ed. 2004).
Miller, 222 Mont. at 216, 721 P.2d at 343.
163 Mont. 270, 517 P.2d 370 (1973).
Id. at 275, 517 P.2d at 374.
Id. at 281-83, 517 P.2d at 377-78.
383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
Haynes, 163 Mont. at 283-84, 517 P.2d at 378.
Miller, 222 Mont. 214, 220-22, 721 P.2d 342, 346-47 (1986).
BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY
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Miller would therefore lose. For whatever reason, the court did
not apply that precedent, but instead analyzed the exculpatory
clause in the light of a Field Code statute, Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-702:
28-2-702. Contracts which violate policy of the law - exemption from responsibility. All contracts which have for their object,
directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his
own fraud, for willful injury to the person or property of another, or
for violation of law,
whether willful or negligent, are against the pol1 16
icy of the law.

Recognizing that the statute came to Montana from the Field
Code via California, Justice Morrison invoked a standard principle of statutory interpretation: if a state borrows a statute from
another state, it also borrows that state's interpretation of the
statute. 1 17 California had consistently interpreted the statute to
mean that a party could not contract to exculpate itself 1) from
fraud, 2) from intentional torts, or 3) from violations of the law. 118
On the issue of whether a party could exculpate itself from its acts
of ordinary negligence, California had concluded that this area
was not addressed in the statute and used the Tunkl test to determine whether exculpation from negligence would be permissible
in a particular context. 119
Rejecting the California approach, the Miller court took a
closer look at the statute. Noting that the statute provides that
contracts which exculpate from "violation of law" are not enforceable, the court asked the eternal question, "What is law?" It answered that question by stating that law is not only constitutions
and statutes, but common law as well. 120 And the common law
establishes that a person has certain legal duties, such as not acting negligently. Therefore, when the statute provides that a person cannot agree to a "violation of law," it must be saying that a
person cannot agree to exculpation from negligence. If this is the
case, then the public/private distinction is irrelevant. Therefore,
regardless of the context, no one can ever agree to an exculpatory
clause. 121
116. Id. at 220, 721 P.2d at 345-46 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-702 (2005)).
117. Id., 721 P.2d at 346.
118. Id., 721 P.2d at 346 (citing Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d, 441, 441
(Cal. 1963)).
119. Id. at 220-21, 721 P.2d at 346 (citing Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 441).
120. Id. at 221, 721 P.2d at 346-47.
121. Miller, 222 Mont. at 221, 721 P.2d at 347. The court here did not seek assistance of
another statute from Title 1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-101 (2005) provides:
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This case, like many applying the Field Code, has the effect of
taking away freedom of contract and regulating the contracting
process. In Miller, the Montana Supreme Court held that every
exculpatory clause is unenforceable and there is no way to draft
around that conclusion. 122 This will come as news to parties who
continue to employ exculpatory clauses in their contracts. 123 I am
not sure why these practices continue in the face of Miller. It may
be that the drafter is being deceptive, inserting an unenforceable
provision for its in terrorem value. It may be that the drafter is
making a good faith attempt to test the law, in the hopes that a
reconstructed Montana Supreme Court will look at it differently.1 2 4 And it just might be too unbelievable that such an outra25
geous decision was made, so drafters proceed as if it had not.
E.

The Field Code Is Law Frozen in an EarlierTime

It has often been said that the glory of the common law has
been its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Even the
Role of the judge - preference to construction giving each provision
meaning. In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to
insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where there are
several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted
as will give effect to all.
122. Miller, 222 Mont. at 221, 721 P.2d at 347.
123. My employer, for example. A couple of years ago, when I took a rafting trip sponsored by The University of Montana, the University had me sign an exculpatory clause. I
have even seen agreements in which trucking companies allow spouses to ride as long as
they sign an exculpatory clause.
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003) states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist
a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.
125. I hope it is clear that my point is not that the exculpatory clause in Miller should
have been enforced (although I do think that), but that the issue of whether it should have
been enforced should have been the subject of meaningful analysis. Karl Llewellyn criticized courts that "construed" the language of contracts into meaning something the language clearly did not mean rather than facing squarely the issue of whether the substance
should be enforced. Much the same could be said of the Court's construction of the statute
in Miller: "[S] ince they purport to construe, and do not really construe, nor are intended to,
but are instead tools of intentional and creative misconstruction, they seriously embarrass
later efforts at true construction, later efforts to get at the true meaning of those wholly
legitimate contracts and clauses which call for their meaning to be got at instead of
avoided. The net effect is unnecessary confusion and unpredictability, together with inadequate remedy, and evil persisting that calls for remedy. Covert tools are never reliable
tools." Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939).
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UCC, as a "common law code," 12 6 has shown amazing resiliency in
its ability to address commercial transactions in the fifty years
since its adoption. The Montana Field Code statutes, however,
have shown an amazing lack of resiliency. We are using statutes
that remain largely unchanged since their creation in the 1860s
and their adoption in Montana in the 1890s. Two examples of law
frozen in time are the elements of a contract and the standard for
mental incapacity.
1.

Elements of a Contract

If a person ever needed a handy definition of contract, Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-101 is available for guidance: "A
12 7
contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing."
Gee, that sure was helpful. The Code then goes on to tell us what
the "essential elements" of a contract are:
Essential elements of a contract. It is essential to the existence
of a contract that there be:
(1) identifiable parties capable of contracting;
(2) their consent;
(3) a lawful object; and
(4) a sufficient cause or consideration. 128

The element I want to call attention to is subsection (4), "a
sufficient cause or consideration." We are all familiar with the
concept of consideration,but does anyone know what cause is?129
Yet it is in the backbone of our contracts statutes! It is astonishing that in our more than one-hundred-year history, the state has
had plenty of cases where the Montana Supreme Court has explored whether there is consideration for a contract, but none
where it has asked whether there is cause. The enforcement of
agreements on a theory of cause would undoubtedly throw our
system through a loop, for under the civil law understanding of
cause, a broader array of agreements would be enforced than is
enforced under the common law understanding of consideration.
126. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037,
1042-43 (1960-61).
127. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-101 (2005).
128.
129.
reader
Keyes,

Id. § 28-2-102.
I won't give it away (which is another way of saying I don't understand it), but the
who wants to learn more about the meaning of cause might consult William Noel
Cause and Considerationin California- A Re-Appraisal, 47 CAL.L. REv. 74 (1959).
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Standardfor Mental Capacity

Many cases nationally have explored the proper test to determine when a person lacks capacity to contract due to mental illness. 1 30 The classic test was one of cognitive ability, asking
whether the person "understood" the transaction. Modem psychiatry, however, has shown that a person may be capable of understanding the transaction, but may not be able to act in accordance
with that understanding. 13 For example, a person suffering from
bipolar disorder (manic-depression) who is in the manic stage
may, because of the mental illness, be unable to act in accordance
with his or her understanding.
The common law growth of the law is demonstrated by courts
in jurisdictions such as Texas, which in Nohra v. Evans13 2 replaced the cognitive test with the motivational test:
In this case we are urged to extend the established rule beyond
the test of understanding, or cognition, to encompass motivation, or
exercise of will, on the theory that appellant acted under compulsion of a mental disorder but for which the writings would not have
been executed.
As observed earlier, no court in this state has approved a test
for mental capacity other than under the cognitive standard, except
as the rule has been enlarged in will cases to include insane delusions when delusions are shown to be intimately related to the making of a will.
Thus we arrive at the point of deciding whether the traditional
standard governing competency to contract fails to account for the
person who, because of mental illness, lacks the ability to control his
or her conduct, even though the ability to understand appears to be
unimpaired. We believe that the understanding test does fail to afford the finder of facts the opportunity to determine whether a person who is mentally ill, having met the standard of cognition, nevertheless lacks the ability to control his conduct, at the time the contract was made, because of his mental affliction.
Only within the twentieth century have developments in the
science of mind and mental behavior made it clear that all mental
faculties are not simultaneously affected by mental illness, the contrary being a belief held by the courts during the years in which the
13 3
cognitive standard evolved and became established.

The Texas court was able to change the rule. What would
happen should a similar case be brought in Montana? We would
130.
131.
1969).
132.
133.

53 AM. Jun. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 156 (2006).
See, e.g., Ortelere v. Teachers' Ret. Bd. of the City of N.Y., 250 N.E.2d 460 (NY
509 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App. 1974).
Id. at 654.
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first have to look to the relevant statute, Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-203, which provides as follows:
Contracts of persons with limited understanding. A conveyance or other contract of a person of unsound mind but not entirely
without understanding, made before his incapacity has been judicially determined, is subject to rescission as provided in part 17 of
this chapter.134

We do not have a modern Montana case on point, so we can
look to the relevant California law for guidance in interpreting
this statute. In the case of Smalley v. Baker,135 like the Texas
court in Nohra, the California court was asked to apply the modern motivational test rather than the cognitive test where a person with bipolar disorder entered into a contract. 136 The Smalley
court concluded that because Civil Code section 39, the source of
Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-203, refers to the person's
understanding, the statute embodies the cognitive test and the
legislature had not seen fit to update it:
The manic phase of the illness under discussion is not, however,
a weakness of mind rendering a person incompetent to contract
within the meaning of Civil Code sections 38 and 39. These sections
exclude the manic-depressive psychosis by their very language since
they make specific reference to the person's 'understanding.' This
language, as interpreted by the decisions, establishes the 'understanding' or cognitive test as the prevailing standard of legal competency. As already pointed out, the cognitive test deals with the
mental capacity to understand the nature and purpose and effect of
the transaction and not with the motivation for entering into it. The
manic phase of the manic-depressive psychosis does not impair such
understanding, but only relates to the motivation. Notwithstanding
the long-standing psychiatric recognition of such psychosis the Legislature has not, in its wisdom, seen fit to broaden section 39 so as to
include within its ambit the motivational standard of incompetency....

In the present case all the evidence shows that Smalley did
have the capacity to understand what he was doing. Smalley, Mrs.
Smalley, and Bratton all testified to this effect. The testimony of the
psychiatrists was not to the contrary, the essence of their testimony
in this regard being that Smalley's judgment was affected. This syndrome is characteristic of the manic phase of the manic-depressive
134. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-203 (2005). By the way, the legislature has shown some
capacity to improve the Field Code. Prior to its repeal in 1979, the Montana statutes included Field Code section 13, which provided that "Persons of unsound mind, within the
meaning of this code, are idiots, lunatics, imbeciles, and habitual drunkards." MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 64-104 (Smith 1969) (repealed 1979).
135. 69 Cal. Rptr. 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
136. Id. at 527-28.
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psychosis, but, as previously noted, does not go to the subject's powers of understanding. In short, under the traditional test of competence set out in Civil Code
section 39, Smalley was not incompetent
137
to enter into a contract.

A Montana court might similarly conclude that Montana
could not apply the motivational test, a result which is certainly
consistent with the language and original intent of the statute.
Taking this analysis one step further, assume a Montana lawyer
was able to persuade the court that a person who entered a contract in Montana lacked mental capacity as defined in the statute.
What happens next? Note that section 28-2-203 of the Montana
Code does not provide that the contract of the person of unsound
mind is voidable, but that it is "subject to rescission as provided in
part 17 of this chapter."138 In part 17 of chapter 2, we find the
relevant statute, Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-1711,
which provides:
When party may rescind. A party to a contract may rescind the
same in the following cases only:
(1) if the consent of the party rescinding or of any party jointly contracting with him was given by mistake or obtained through duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds or of any other party to
the contract jointly interested with such party;
(2) if, through the fault of the party as to whom he rescinds, the
consideration for his obligation fails in whole or in part;
(3) if such consideration becomes entirely void from any cause;
(4) if such consideration, before it is rendered to him, fails in a material respect from any cause; or
(5) if all the other parties consent.139

Where does this statute provide that the contract of a mentally
incapacitated person is subject to rescission? It does not say it! In
fact, this issue was addressed in Fleming v. Consolidated Motor
Sales Co. ,140 where the Montana Supreme Court determined that
the plaintiff was mentally incapacitated, but nevertheless concluded that he was unable to avoid the contract:
Giving full sanction to the rule heretofore discussed, we must concede that it is equally well established that in the absence of a showing of entire lack of understanding, and in the absence of fraud or
imposition, there is no degree of mental weakness on the part of
either of the contracting parties recognized in the law as vitiating a
137. Id. at 528-29.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-203 (2005).
139. Id. § 28-2-1711.
140. 74 Mont. 245, 240 P. 376 (1925).

138.
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contract. The law does not 1presume to make a distinction between
14
much and little intellect.

The California legislature may not have enacted the motivational test, but it did remedy this oversight. Civil Code section
1689, the California analog to section 28-2-1711, was amended to
provide for rescission when there has been a finding of incapacity
under section 39, the analog to section 28-2-203.142 In Montana,
however, we must continue to live with an antiquated statute.
V.

CONCLUSION

These examples demonstrate that the Field Code creates
many opportunities for mischief. The solution is simple - repeal
the Field Code provisions in the Montana Code Annotated. Has
something as radical as the repealing of hundreds of laws ever
been done? Curiously, it was done in California, which in 1850
adopted the "American common law" as its law, presumably to
43
make clear that it would no longer follow the law of Mexico. 1 It
was not until twenty-two years later that California enacted the
Field Code, and unlike Montana, it did so after considerable debate and modification of the Field Code to meet its needs and heri44
tage.1
141. Id. at 264, 240 P. at 382.
142. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1689 (West 2005) (emphasis added), states:
§ 1689. Grounds
(a) A contract may be rescinded if all the parties thereto consent.
(b) A party to a contract may rescind the contract in the following cases:
(1) If the consent of the party rescinding, or of any party jointly contracting with
him, was given by mistake, or obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue
influence, exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds,
or of any other party to the contract jointly interested with such party.
(2) If the consideration for the obligation of the rescinding party fails, in whole or
in part, through the fault of the party as to whom he rescinds.
(3) If the consideration for the obligation of the rescinding party becomes entirely
void from any cause.
(4) If the consideration for the obligation of the rescinding party, before it is rendered to him, fails in a material respect from any cause.
(5) If the contract is unlawful for causes which do not appear in its terms or conditions, and the parties are not equally at fault.
(6) If the public interest will be prejudiced by permitting the contract to stand.
(7) Under the circumstances provided for in Sections 39, 1533, 1566, 1785, 1789,
1930 and 2314 of this code, Section 2470 of the Corporations Code, Sections 331,
338, 359, 447, 1904 and 2030 of the Insurance Code or any other statute providing
for rescission.
143. Van Alstyne, supra note 44, at text accompanying nn.7-8.
144. Id., at text accompanying nn.44-59.
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Some might ask whether we would have any law after repeal
of the statutes. During the 1990s, Montana was the butt of much
humor because it allegedly did not have a speed limit. Montana
did, of course, have a speed limit. That speed limit was "a rate of
speed no greater than is reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation." 145 Those glorious days
came to an end, however, when the Montana Supreme Court, in
State v. Stanko, 146 declared this "basic rule" to be unconstitutionally vague, concluding that, in Justice Trieweiler's words, "the average motorist in Montana would have no idea of the speed at
which he or she could operate his or her motor vehicle on this
State's highways without violating Montana's 'basic rule' based
simply on the speed at which he or she is traveling."1 47 The legislature promptly changed the speed limit to the more prosaic "70
miles an hour during the daytime and 65 miles an hour during the
8
nighttime."14
The court's analysis of the speed limit illustrates the commonly held belief that if we only have basic rules, then we do not
have laws or we do not know what the laws are.' 49 The concern is
the same when the law is found in the common law instead of
codes. Field claimed that common law was unwritten law, and
hence unknown law:
The question whether a Code is desirable is simply a question between written and unwritten law. That this was ever debatable is
one of the most remarkable facts in the history of jurisprudence. If
the law is a thing to be obeyed, it is a thing to be known, and if it is
145. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-303(1) (1997) (repealed 1999).
146. 1998 MT 321, 292 Mont. 192, 974 P.2d 1132.
147. Id. 1]28. Three justices dissented. Id.
33-40. Let's list that honor roll here:
Justices Turnage, Regnier, and Gray.
148. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-303(1)(b) (2005). Of course, lest a person think it was permissible always to travel at this numerical rate of speed, the newly enacted statute also
provided:
(4) Subject to the maximum speed limits set forth in subsections (1) and (2), a
person shall operate a vehicle in a careful and prudent manner and at a reduced
rate of speed no greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions existing at the point of operation, taking into account the amount and character of
traffic, visibility, weather, and roadway conditions.
Id. § 61-8-303(4) (2005) (amended 1999).
149. After I wrote this, I discovered that the great Richard Danzig had used the same
analogy in A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 621, 633 (1975). Danzig's point is that the legislature is best suited to set a particular
speed limit, such as 75 miles per hour, because the legislature's emphasis is on the result,
not the method. A court is best suited to make a decision as to whether a particular speed
is unreasonable, but it should not set a limit. In enacting the "basic rule," then, Danzig
sees the legislature as having acted more like a court making a common law rule.
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to be known, there can be no better, not to say no other, method of
making it known than of writing and publishing
it. If a written con150
stitution is desirable, so are written laws.

The argument has superficial appeal, but it is specious. If we
did not have this writing, if we had a law of contracts that was the
equivalent of our late lamented "reasonable and proper" speed
limit, would we have any difficulty determining what factors to
consider when determining the outcome of an issue in contract
law? I do not think so. Even Rudy Stanko, who spoiled the basic
speed limit rule for the rest of us, admitted that his proclivity to
speed was due not to the fact that he could not tell the difference
between a reasonable speed and an unreasonable speed, but due
15 1
to the fact that he had a lead foot.
Without the statutes, our lawyers and courts when planning
transactions and making decisions would have to revert to the
great body of common law contracts. Is this an accessible body of
law? The codifiers claimed that to know what the rule was, a person had to read all the decided cases on point and synthesize
them. And because a person was unlikely to do that before acting,
a person would not know what the law was until after the person
had acted. The English codifier Jeremy Bentham referred to the
common law as "dog law," for a person trains a dog by punishing it
for not following a rule, and thus teaches it what the rule is after
15 2
the fact.
But this is nonsense, or, as Bentham himself liked to say,
"nonsense on stilts."' 53 A person never had to read all the common law cases to discover what the common law rule is, because
there was always someone willing to synthesize the cases in the
form of a treatise or encyclopedia in which a person could find a
coherent statement of the rules and principles, often supplemented with commentary. At one time these rules and principles
150. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, at vii (Weed,

Parsons & Co. 1865). I have speculated elsewhere that the reason the Field Code raises
the status of written contracts to unnecessary heights is because the Field Code itself elevates the value of writing to unnecessary heights. See Debate, supra note 7, at 401.
151. Conversation with Stanko around a poker table somewhere in Montana in the dim
past. As another example, I recall many years ago that my faculty was considering what to
do about a student who had cheated on an exam. The faculty member who had given the
exam was concerned that he "had not told students not to cheat" and therefore they didn't
know better. My colleague Al Stone responded dryly, "There must be a common law of
cheating."
152. Debate, supra note 7, at 382.
153. JEREMY BENTHAM, RIGHTS, REPRESENTATIONS, AND REFORM: NONSENSE UPON STILTS
AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Philip Schofield et al. eds., 2002).
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could be found in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. Today they are elucidated in the well-written Restatement
(Second) of the Law of Contracts and in numerous treatises, such
as Corbin on Contracts and Farnsworth on Contracts.
So let us repeal the statutes, except for the few that either
change the common law rule or that are regulatory. Then, instead
of mechanically applying or misapplying antiquated statutes, our
courts and lawyers would have to identify the policies behind the
rules and justify those policies in a modern setting. Through that
process, contracts jurisprudence would have an opportunity to
flower in Montana.
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